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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I. MISREPRESENTATION AS TO PRIOR PHYSICAL CONDITION
The South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act' is a leg-
islative response to an emphatic public demand for a system
which affords every industrial worker protection against the haz-
ards of his employment.2 With limited exceptions,3 employees are
entitled to protection irrespective of fault, negligence or wilful-
ness.4 The Act, however, is silent as to the effect of an employee's
wilful misrepresentations to a prospective employer; no express
provision bars or limits compensation benefits by reason of an
employee's misrepresentation with respect to prior injury or phys-
ical disability other than an occupational disease.5
In Cooper v. McDevitt & Street Co.,' the South Carolina
Supreme Court first considered this statutory silence. Appellant
Cooper had previously sustained a serious back injury which had
been determined by the Industrial Commission to result in a
fourteen per cent partial permanent disability to the lumbar
spine. Three years after his initial injury, Cooper obtained em-
ployment as a welder at respondent McDevitt's construction site
in Charleston, South Carolina. In a pre-employment question-
naire, Cooper noted that he suffered from a back probIem which
1. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-1 et seq. (1962).
2. Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190 S.C. 336, 2 S.E.2d 825 (1939). The costs of
cash-wage benefits and medical care to victims of work connected injuries are ultimately
placed upon the consumer through the medium of employer insurance whose premiums
are included in the cost of the product.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-156 (1962) bars payment of benefits when injury or death
was occasioned by the intoxication or wilful intention of the employee. This limitation
reflects legislative response to public condemnation of both drunkenness and suicide. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 72-155 (1962) allows compensation benefits to be reduced by ten per cent
when injury or death was caused by an employee's wilful failure to use a safety appliance,
to perform a statutory duty, or to follow a rule or regulation adopted by the employer,
approved by the Industrial Commission, and known to the employee.
4. See Layton v. Hammond-Brown-Jennings Co., 190 S.C. 425, 3 S.E.2d 492 (1939).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-257 (1962) provides:
If an employee, at the time of his employment, wilfully and falsely represents
in writing that he has not previously suffered from the disease which is the cause
of disability or death, no compensation shall be payable. If an employee who
has previously suffered from an occupational disease desires to continue in an
employment to which such a disease is a hazard, he may waive his right to
receive further benefits for disablement or disability from such disease by writ-
ten agreement approved by the Commission in accordance with such rules as it
may promulgate.
6. 260 S.C. 463, 196 S.E.2d 833 (1973) (Bussey & Brailsford, JJ., dissenting).
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precluded heavy work and lifting. McDevitt terminated Cooper's
employment approximately four months later after Cooper re-
turned to work several days late following the Christmas holidays.
Cooper, thereafter, left Charleston for Columbia where he subse-
quently applied for a welder's position with McDevitt which was
engaged in enlarging the football stadium at the University of
South Carolina. At the Columbia site, Cooper completed another
questionnaire but responded in the negative to the inquiry,
"Have you now or have you ever had . . . back trouble?" After
being hired, Cooper remained in McDevitt's employ for over a
month until he sustained an injury to his lower back by an acci-
dent arising out of and in the course of his employment. McDevitt
denied liability for compensation because Cooper had intention-
ally misrepresented and concealed his previous back injury and,
by reason thereof, was not an employee within the meaning of the
Act.7 The Industrial Commission granted workmen's compensa-
tion benefits to Cooper, but the circuit court reversed the award.
In remanding the case to the Industrial Commission for a
specific finding on whether or not there was a causal connection
between Cooper's misrepresentation and subsequent injury, the
South Carolina Supreme Court announced:
The general rule is that the following must be present before
a false statement in an employment application will bar bene-
fits: (1) The employee must have knowingly and wilfully made
a false representation as to his physical condition. (2) The em-
ployer must have relied upon the false representation and this
reliance must have been a substantial factor in the hiring. (3)
There must have been a causal connection between the false
representation and the injury.'
In enunciating this rule, the court relied exclusively on Professor
Larson's statement of it as it appears in some jurisdictions.' Pro-
fessor Larson, however, does not indicate that the rule is followed
by most jurisdictions; instead, he styles this rule as "[w]hat
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-11 (Cum. Supp. 1973) defines an employee as follows:
[Elvery person engaged in an employment under any appointment, contract
of hire or apprenticeship, expressed or implied, oral or written, including aliens
and also including minors, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, but ex-
cluding a person whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the
trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer. . ..
8. 260 S.C. at 468, 196 S.E.2d at 835.
9. See 1A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 47.53 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON].
1974]
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seems to be emerging, in place of a conceptual approach relying
on purely contractual tests, . . . a common-sense rule made up
of a melange of contract, causation, and estoppel ingredients."'' 0
As a general rule, where employment is induced by false and
fraudulent representations not going to the factum of the employ-
ment contract, the contract is voidable and not void ab initio.
The relationship of employer and employee exists, even though
the misrepresentation may form a just reason for the rescission
of the contract, and recovery may be had by the employee guilty
of misrepresentation." The view that misrepresentations may bar
compensation benefits stems from an early Supreme Court deci-
sion in Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Rock.'2 There, the
Court refused to allow the claimant under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act'3 to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
by him while employed in employer's railroad yard. Because
employee Rock had obtained employment by a series of decep-
tions and fraudulent representations, the Court determined that
his failure to disclose his physical condition
was a continuing wrong in the nature of a cheat .... [H]is
status [as an employee] was at all times wrongful, a fraud upon
the petitioner, and a peril to its patrons and its other employees.
Right to recovery may not justly or reasonably be rested on a
foundation so abhorent to public policy.'
5
Contemporaneous interpretation of the Rock decision does not
support the contention that vague notions of public policy would
deny benefits to an employee who obtained employment fraudu-
lently.'" Nevertheless, the dicta of Rock caused a great deal of
confusion in the federal courts. Ultimately, in Still v. Norfolk &
10. Id.
11. Annot., 136 A.L.R. 1124 (1942).
12. 279 U.S. 410 (1929).
13. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51 et seq. (1972).
14. Joe Rock had originally applied for a job in his own name and had been rejected
because of his physical condition. A few days later, he reapplied for the same job but used
the name John Rock to conceal the fact that he had recently been rejected for the position.
He then arranged to have an imposter take the railway's physical examination. After the
imposter had passed the examination, Rock reported for work and was hired.
15. 279 U.S. at 415.
16. In Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. v. Borum, 286 U.S. 447 (1932), Mr.
Justice Butler, who had spoken for the Court in Rock, again expressed the Court's reluc-
tance to extend Rock to every fraudulent violation of rules or regulations framed by the
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Western Ry. ,,1 the Court limited Rock to its precise facts to insure
inclusion of employees under the F.E.L.A.
The Rock "doctrine", although largely disregarded in both
federal and state jurisdictions when read with the limiting lan-
guage of Still, had a significant-albeit indirect-impact on the
formulation of the South Carolina Supreme Court's rule in
Cooper. Professor Larson, upon whom the court relied in Cooper,
cites favorably the modern statement of the rule regarding em-
ployee misrepresentations found in Martin Co. v. Carpenter."5 In
rather lengthy and unnecessary dicta, 9 the Supreme Court of
Florida formulated the rule that:
[A] false representation as to physical condition or health
made by an employee in procuring employment will preclude
the benefits . . for an otherwise compensable injury if there is
shown to be a causal relationship between the injury and the
false representation and if it is also shown that (1) the employee
knew the representation to be false; (2) the employer relied upon
the false representation; and (3) such reliance resulted in conse-
quent injury to the employee."
17. 368 U.S. 35 (1961). In Still the railroad denied liability under the F.E.L.A. be-
cause the petitioner was not employed by it within the meaning of the Act. They alleged
that petitioner (1) had made false representations in an employment application with
regard to his physical condition, (2) would not have been hired but for these misrepresen-
tations, and (3) that the physical defects, which had been fraudulently concealed, contrib-
uted to petitioner's injury. Mr. Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated:
[T]he Rock case, properly interpreted, lays down no general rule at all.
. . . Rock must be limited to its precise facts. In the face of the legislative policy
embodied in the Federal Employers' Liability Act that a railroad should pay
damages to its workers and their families for personal injuries inflicted by the
railroad's negligence . . . considerations of public policy of the general kind
relied upon by the court in Rock cannot be permitted to encroach further upon
the special policy expressed by Congress in the Act . . . . And this conclusion
is not affected by the fact that an employee's misrepresentation may have...
contributed to the injury or even to the accident upon which his action is based.
Id. at 44.
18. 132 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1961). Employee Carpenter suffered from spondylolesthesis,
a congenital condition of the lumbar spine in which there is a lack of fusion in posterior
parts of a vertebra with bone being replaced by fibrocartilage. When applying for a job
with Martin, Carpenter stated in a pre-employment questionnaire that she suffered from
no back ailments. After one year in Martin's employ, she was changed to a job which
required standing and bending over a table.This new job aggravated her back condition
and necessitated an operation for which Martin denied liability by virtue of Carpenter's
misrepresentation.
19. The court held that claimant's injury was not an "accidental injury" upon which
a compensation award could be predicated since FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.02(19) (1966)
defined an accident as "an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly."
Resolution of the issue of employee misrepresentation thus became mere surplusage.
20. 132 So. 2d at 406.
1974]
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To support the soundness of the stated rule, the court in Martin
cited with approval the rationale of Rock l but completely ignored
the contemporaneous interpretation of Rock which severely lim-
ited its application.22 Consequently, reliance upon Martin is reli-
ance, in part, upon Rock and its unusual and extraordinary fac-
tual situation which has no application to the facts of Cooper.
The court in Martin also supported its rule upon policy
considerations. It reasoned that an employer takes the employee
as he finds him and assumes the risk of hiring an infirm employee
and that, therefore, wisdom and fairness would dictate that an
employer be allowed to minimize such risk through inquiries con-
cerning a prospective employee's physical condition. Misrepre-
sentations by an employee would seemingly defeat an employer's
attempts at self-protection. This argument, however, is not per-
suasive. Policy considerations based on the axiomatic premise
that a wrongdoer should be precluded from profiting from his
fraud or wilful misrepresentation have only limited application to
workmen's compensation benefits. While this axiom is true at
common law in ordinary civil suits, it is not applicable in most
cases involving workmen's compensation claims. Workmen's
compensation is fundamentally different from traditional strict
tort liability. The right to compensation depends not upon fault
but solely upon whether there was a work connected injury. The
underlying policy of workmen's compensation seeks to provide
social protection for employees and their dependents. It does not
seek to right a wrong. Ultimately, the defenses raised in common
law civil actions are not available in workmen's compensation
claims.2
Despite misplaced reliance upon both the Rock doctrine and
traditional common law notions of fairness, the court in Martin
discerned a valid basis for its rule in legislative intent. The Flor-
ida legislature had not considered the effect of an employee's false
21. 279 U.S. at 415; see note 16 supra.
22. Still, in which the Supreme Court limited Rock to its precise facts, was decided
several months after the Florida court gave its opinion in Martin. In City of Miami v. Ford,
252 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1971), the Florida Supreme Court had an opportunity to reappraise
their rule in light of Still. The court however merely restated the Martin rule and applied
it to the facts of the case without further discussion.
23. 1 LARSON § 2.10. Where wilfulness is a consideration, legislatures have enacted
special provisions into their workmen's compensation statutes. In South Carolina, wilful-
ness bars or limits benefits only in instances of misrepresentation regarding an occupa-
tional disease, in death cases caused by drunkenness or suicide, or where an employee has
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representations as to prior physical condition except in instances
of pre-existing occupational diseases. 24 The legislature had, how-
ever, created a special disability, or second injury fund which
allowed employers to be reimbursed for compensation paid an
employee for disability resulting from a pre-existing condition.2
Prior to adoption of second injury provisions, an employer was
generally held liable for an employee's entire disability resulting
from a combination of a prior disability and a present injury. 6 If,
for example, an employer hired someone who had lost his sight
in one eye, he became liable for total disability if the disabled
employee lost sight in his other eye in a subsequent injury. To
avoid the harsh impact of this rule of full liability, employers
understandably discriminated against disabled job applicants.
The creation of a second injury fund was intended to encourage
the hiring of handicapped workers. 21 Consistent with this legisla-
tive policy, an employer, to qualify for reimbursement, must have
had knowledge of the pre-existing condition when he hired the
employee or have continued employment after obtaining such
knowledge.2 After reviewing legislative intent which prompted
adoption of second injury fund provisions, the court opined that
extension of compensation benefits to an employee who
misrepresents his physical condition would not only rob employ-
ers of the ability to choose employees freely but would deny the
employer the ability to resort to the special disability fund.
2
1
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.151(1)(b) (1966) provides:
No compensation shall be payable for an occupational disease if the em-
ployee, at the time of entering into the employment of the employer by whom
the compensation would otherwise be payable, falsely represents himself in
writing as not having previously been disabled, laid off or compensated in dam-
ages or otherwise, because of such disease.
25. Id. § 440.49.
26. 2 LARSON § 59.00.
27. Id.
28. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.19(h) (1966) specifically provides:
As used in this subsection [Special Disability Trust Fund], permanent
physical impairment means any permanent condition due to previous accident
or disease or any congenital condition which is or is likely to be a hindrance or
obstacle to employment and which was known to the employer prior to the
occurence of the subsequent injury or occupational disease (emphasis added).
Contra, Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 56 Cal. 2d 842, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 144, 366 P.2d 496 (1961). California does not require the employer to have prior
knowledge of a handicap because the employee seeks compensation directly from the
Subsequent Injuries Fund. The employer does not incur full liability for subsequent inju-
ries.
29. Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So. 2d 400, 406 (Fla. 1961).
1974]
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The South Carolina legislature has recently enacted a
comprehensive Second Injury Fund." To prevent discrimination
against handicapped workers in hiring practices, the legislature
has directed that the costs of successive injuries be apportioned
between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. Although the
employer initially pays the full amount of compensation to which
an injured employee is entitled, he can apply to the Fund for
reimbursement of all compensation payable in excess of one
hundred and four weeks.3 ' Consistent with legislative intent to
promote employment of disabled workers, an employer's reim-
bursement from the Second Injury Fund is conditioned upon his
establishing "by written records. . .that the employer had
knowledge of the permanent physical impairment at the time
that the employee was hired, or at the time that the employee was
retained in employment after the employer acquired such knowl-
edge.' 12 The Second Injury Fund became effective on July 1,
1972, but it was made applicable only to second injuries occurring
after that date and to employees having a permanent physical
impairment who were employed or retained in employment after
that date.3 3 The accident in Cooper occurred on February 17,
1971.31 Consequently, McDevitt could not have sought reimburse-
ment from the Second Injury Fund. However, the mere exist-
ence of the Fund, irrespective of the applicability of its provisions
to the facts in Cooper, is significant in determining whether the
legislature intended to bar compensation benefits to employees
who falsely represented their physical condition.
The rationale of Martin has provided other jurisdictions a
30. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-601 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1973). All but four states-
Georgia, Louisiana, Nevada, and Virginia-have adopted some type of second injury fund
or its equivalent. See 2 LARSON § 59.31.
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-601 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
32. Id. § 72-601(c).
33. No. 1390, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2578.
34. Brief for Appellant at 7, Cooper v. McDevitt & Street Co., 260 S.C. 463, 196
S.E.2d 833 (1973).
35. In Cooper there are indications that the attorney for Cooper was either not aware
of the existence of South Carolina's Second Injury Fund or did not realize its significance:
In connection with the question here under consideration, it is submitted
that the Supreme Court of this State would take notice of past evidence of
rehabilitative agencies seeking to urge upon the Legislature of this State an
amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act . . . .The purpose of such
legislation is clearly to encourage employers to hire persons who have suffered
previous injuries or disabilities. The Legislature of this State has not yet seen
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foundation upon which to formulate a similar rule to bar benefits
where an employee has misrepresented his physical condition. In
Air Mod Corp. v. Newton,31 the Supreme Court of Delaware
reversed and remanded an award of the Industrial Accident
Board to take evidence on claimant's misrepresentations under
its newly formulated rule.37 The court founded its decision upon
the Rock "doctrine" and upon "evidence in the [Workmen's
Compensation] Statute of a public policy regarding an em-
ployee's obligation of truthful pre-employment health disclosure"
because Delaware's "Second Injury Fund. .. and the apportion-
ment provision . . . are premised upon an employer's knowledge
of an employee's prior injury, disease or infirmity."38 Martin was
cited favorably as being considerate of both public policy and
principles of fairness and justice. In Volunteers of America of
Madison, Inc. v. Industrial Commission," the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court adopted the Martin rule despite the non-existence
of a second injury fund. The Wisconsin Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act did, however, contain a special provision" requiring epi-
36. 59 Del. 148, 215 A.2d 434 (1965). Claimant had sustained a back injury in a fall
in 1937 but waited almost twenty years before undergoing back surgery. Five months after
the surgery, he obtained a job as a welder with Air Mod. Prior to his employment, Newton
wrote "no" to the following questions: "Any physical defect or chronic disease?" and
"Have you been confined by illness in past year?"
37. The rule formulated by the court is identical with that contained in 1A
LARSON § 47.53 and in Martin. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
38. 59 Del. at 157, 215 A.2d at 440.
39. Id.
40. 30 Wis. 2d 607, 141 N.W.2d 890 (1966) (Fairchild, J., dissenting). Because de-
ceased employee Cusic left no one wholly dependent upon him, the State of Wisconsin
filed a claim against Volunteers for death benefits. Cusic had been employed as a coun-
selor at a summer camp and, prior to employment, had been required to complete a health
examination form. Although Cusic had a long history of epileptic seizures, he did not
indicate such on the form nor did he inform an examining physician of his past history.
In the course of his employment, Cusic drowned in an unwitnessed accident with no
indication of trauma or other injury. An epileptic seizure could have caused his fall into
the camp's lake. The Industrial Commission determined the cause of the fall was imma-
terial since Wisconsin followed the "positional risk" or "increased hazard" doctrine. This
finding was set aside by the circuit court and remanded for determination of the cause of
the fall consistent with Wisconsin's special epilepsy provision.
41. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.08 (1973) provides:
Epileptics . . .may elect not to be subject to the provisions of this chapter
for injuries resulting because of such epilepsy . . . and still remain subject to
its provisions for all other injuries. . . .Such elections shall be made by giving
notice to the employer in writing on a form to be furnished by the department,
and filing a copy of such notice with the department. An election may be re-
voked by giving written notice to the employer of revocation, and such notice
shall be effective upon filing a copy of such notice with the department.
8
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leptics to disclose their condition to prospective employers who
may then require a waiver from liability for injuries caused by an
epileptic seizure. The special provision was framed to encourage
employers to hire epileptics without fear of liability for subse-
quent injuries caused by seizures. Citing Air Mod Corp. and
Martin, the court recognized that the special epileptic provision
was analagous to a second injury fund which implicitly required
an employee not to conceal his epileptic condition.4 2 In Federal
Copper & Aluminum Co. v. Dickey,43 the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee adopted the Martin rule after finding legislative intent in
sections of their act providing for waivers,14 as in Volunteers, and
for a second injury fund," as in Martin.
Only two jurisdictions, in which the issue of employee misre-
presentations as to prior health has been raised, have rejected the
Martin rule. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in H. J. Jeffries
Truck Line v. Gresham" awarded compensation benefits to an
employee who had falsely represented that he had no heart condi-
tion despite the existence of a second injury fund provision.
While ignoring a strong dissent which urged adoption of the
Martin rule, the majority stated:
Our Workmen's Compensation Act is silent on the effect of
42. See 30 Wis. 2d at 616, 141 N.W.2d at 894 (1966).
43. 493 S.W.2d 463 (Tenn. 1973). Dickey had sustained a back injury which required
removal of a disc from his back and a subsequent injury which required his wearing a
brace. Three years later, Dickey slipped while in Federal's employ and reinjured his back.
Federal claimed that Dickey had falsified his application for employment to avoid Fed-
eral's policy of not hiring employees with histories of back injuries.
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1109 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
45. Id. § 50-1027.
46. 397 P.2d 637 (Okla. 1964) (5-3 decision). In Jeffries claimant denied having a
"heart disease" when questioned by a nurse preliminary to his pre-employment physical
examination. At the time of the examination, however, claimant was still under medical
care from his first heart attack and was taking an anti-coagulant remedy prescribed by a
physician.
47. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85 § 171 et seq. (1970). The subsequent injuries provisions
of the Oklahoma statutory scheme differ drastically, as to the requirement of prior em-
ployer knowledge, from those of South Carolina:
For the purpose of this Act, the term "physically impaired person" is hereby
defined to be a person who as the result of accident, disease, birth, military
action, or any other cause, has suffered the loss of the sight of one eye, the loss
by amputation of the whole or a part of some member of his body, or the loss of
the use, or partial loss of the use, of a specific member such as is obvious and
apparent from observation or examination by an ordinary layman, that is, a
person who is not skilled in the medical profession, or any disability which
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employee's false representation which does not amount to fraud
in esse contractus and render the contract absolutely void...
In the absence of a clear legislative intent, we do not feel at
liberty to impose any limitations, forfeitures or abridgements
upon the employee's statutory right to recover compensation."
In Georgia, the court in General Motors Corp. v. Hargis49 held an
employer liable for benefits upon the doctrine of inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius. 0 The court discerned legislative intent not to
adopt the Martin rule since Georgia's statutory scheme specifi-
cally barred compensation where a prospective employee
misrepresented his physical condition' but remained silent as to
all other instances of misrepresentation.
In Cooper, the majority of the court accepted Professor Lar-
son's statement of the general rule derived from Martin. The
dissent, in turn, placed heavy reliance upon Hargis and Jeffries
in asserting the absence of legislative intent to bar compensation
benefits to employees who misrepresent their physical condition
while seeking employment.13 This reliance is misplaced. The Sec-
ond Injury Fund with the specific requirement of employer knowl-
edge impliedly places a duty upon handicapped employees to
reveal their physical condition or prior injury to an inquiring
employer so that the employer can take advantage of the Fund's
reimbursement provisions. If such a duty is not placed upon
handicapped workers, employers will continue to discriminate in
hiring policies contrary to legislative intent. In rejecting the ra-
tionale of Martin and its progeny, the dissenters were obviously
unaware of the existence of South Carolina's Second Injury Fund:
The second injury fund provision of the Florida statute, relied
on by the court in Martin in support of the stated rule, has no
48. 397 P.2d 637, 643 (Okla. 1964).
49. 114 Ga. App. 143, 150 S.E.2d 303 (1966). Claimant Hargis had fractured his wrist
while playing football several years earlier and had failed to avail himself of proper medi-
cal treatment. The fracture had never healed and an injury to the wrist occurred while
Hargis was operating an air gun. Although the court would allow claimant to receive an
award despite his misrepresentations, the award of the State Board of Workmen's Com-
pensation was reversed and remanded for apportionment.
50. The phrase is defined as "the inclusion of one is the exclusion of another."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 906 (4th rev. ed. 1968). Since the statute in question includes
only false representations regarding occupational diseases, other types of misrepresen-
tations not going to the factum of the employment contract will not be included within
the statutory scheme to bar compensation.
51. GA. CODE ANN. § 114-804 (1973).
52. Cooper v. McDevitt & Street Co., 260 S.C. at 468, 196 S.E.2d at 835 (1973).
53. Id. (Bussey, J., dissenting).
1974]
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counterpart in our Workmen's Compensation Act . ... The
Delaware case of Air Mod Corp. v. Newton. . . also rests...
in substantial part upon the second injury fund provision of its
Workmen's Compensation statute quite similar to, if not identi-
cal with, that of the Florida statute and which again has no
counterpart in our Act. . . . When the statutory differences are
considered, I do not regard any of the cited cases as being really
in point or at all persuasive . .. .
The basic purpose of South Carolina's Workmen's Compen-
sation Act is the inclusion of employees within its terms rather
than their exclusion and the Act's presumptions should be di-
rected toward the end of effective coverage rather than non-
coverage. In applying the newly enunciated general rule of
Cooper, the court should be wary of possible employer efforts to
avoid liability by requiring employees to complete vague, broad,
or complex medical histories prior to employment. Despite mere
existence of false statements on a pre-employment application,
the statements must have been knowingly falsified. An em-
ployee's age, intelligence, educational background, etc., must be
considered as well as the possibility of an honest mistake on the
employee's part. 6 Additionally, if an employee intentionally mis-
represents his physical condition to procure employment and
then remains employed over a period of time, the mere passage
of time gives the employer an opportunity to observe the em-
ployee's job performance and ascertain any pre-existing physical
limitations first hand. The longer the employment, the less rele-
vant the misrepresentations become. 7 Application of the general
rule in Cooper must be consistent with the basic purposes of
compensation benefits.
II. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP
It is fundamental that an employer-employee relationship
must exist before provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
are applicable." Consequently, an employer might seek to avoid
liability for work-connected injuries by contracting or subcon-
tracting work which would normally be done by him. Statutory
54. Id. at 472, 196 S.E.2d at 837.
55. Cagle v. Clinton Cotton Mills, 216 S.C. 93, 56 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
56. See Aron v. Kirk's Lawn Service, 190 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1966).
57. Young v. Morris, 475 S.W.2d 505 (Ky. 1972).
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provisions, however, create a special class of "statutory employ-
ees" to extend compensation coverage to employees of contrac-
tors, subcontractors and sub-subcontractors.59 Since the primary
purpose of such provisions is to prevent evasion of compensation
coverage by contracting of the employer's normal work, the test
of applicability is whether the work performed by "statutory
employees" is normally part of the trade, business, or occupation
of the employer." Although this test seems simple, no formula for
the determination of what is normally performed by common-law
employees is possible, and existence of a statutory employer-
employee relationship is largely determined by the facts of each
case.
61
In Wilson v. Daniel International Corp.,6" the court had to
decide whether a statutory employer-employee relationship ex-
isted in order to determine whether a suit in tort for negligently
inflicted injuries was barred. 3 Wilson was an employee of a
ready-mixed concrete supplier. His duties were to deliver con-
crete, position his truck, and pour the concrete into previously
constructed forms. All processing of the concrete after delivery to
Daniel's construction site was done by Daniel as a general con-
tractor. Upon one such delivery, Wilson was injured by the negli-
gence of one of Daniel's employees. Wilson sued Daniel in tort but
Daniel claimed that Wilson's employer was a subcontractor en-
gaged in the construction business and that Wilson, as a "statu-
tory employee," was restricted to recovery under workmen's com-
pensation. The court noted that ready-mixed concrete is a valua-
ble building material which, because of its nature, cannot be
stockpiled. Instead, concrete must be delivered at the purchaser's
request and poured into forms at the construction site. After ex-
amining the language of the purchase order in which Daniel was
termed the purchaser and Wilson's employer the concrete vendor,
the court concluded:
The transaction [supply of ready-mixed concrete to a construc-
tion site] is essentially a sale and delivery, and the supplier is
59. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 72-111 to 72-113 (1962).
60. Id. See 1A LARSON § 49.00.
61. See Smith v. Fulmer, 198 S.C. 91, 15 S.E.2d 681 (1941).
62. 260 S.C. 548, 197 S.E.2d 686 (1973).
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-121 (1962) makes the Workmen's Compensation Act an
exclusive remedy by employees against employers. Cf. Mack v. R.C. Motor Lines, Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 416 (D.S.C. 1973).
1974]
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a materialman, not a subcontractor engaged in the execution of
part of the work undertaken by the contractor. 4
III. INJURIES ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT
To be entitled to compensation benefits, a workman must
have injuries resulting from an accident "arising out of and in the
course of the employment."65 These statutory words are the crux
of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act and,
consequently, have been the subject of considerable statutory
construction. To ease its burden of construction, courts have re-
duced the phrase to its essential elements. The words "arising out
of employment" refer to the origin or cause of the accident while
the words "in the course of employment" refer to the time, place
and circumstances under which the accident occurs.16 The two
elements are used conjunctively and must be concurrent and si-
multaneous. One without the other will not sustain an award.
Both phrases, however, are so entwined that they are usually
considered together in the reported cases,6" and a recent decision
of the supreme court may have de-emphasized the distinction
between these phrases and initiated a trend toward a more sim-
plified "work-connected" test.
In Carter v. Penney Tire and Recapping Co.,68 the sole issue
upon appeal was whether Carter's injuries "arose out of" his em-
ployment. Carter and another employee of Penney Tire had been
involved in an altercation with Crosby, a non-employee who was
unknown to Carter but known to his co-worker. Several days
later, Carter and his co-worker were repairing a roof on their
employer's property when Crosby saw them by chance. Crosby
then made threatening gestures and sent threats to them. Carter
informed his employer of Crosby's acts and words but was assured
of protection and instructed to return to work. Shortly thereafter,
Crosby returned to the scene and shot Carter. In affirming an
award of compensation benefits, the court held that Carter's inju-
ries arose out of his employment.
As a general rule, when the animosity or dispute that
culminates in an assault is imported into the employment from
64. 260 S.C. at 552, 197 S.E.2d at 688. Accord, Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp.,
103 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 1958).
65. S.C. ConE ANN. § 72-14 (1962).
66. Thompson v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 199 S.C. 304, 19 S.E.2d 226, 228 (1942).
67. Douglas v. Spartan Mills, Startex Div., 245 S.C. 265, 140 S.E.2d 173, 174 (1965).
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the claimant's private life, and is not exacerbated by the employ-
ment, the assault does not "arise out of" employment. 9 Never-
theless, personal and employment causes often combine to pro-
duce an assault, particularly where the employment setting
brings a quarrel to fruition. A court should not weigh the relative
importance of the two causes, nor look for primary and secondary
causes. It should merely inquire whether the employment was a
contributing factor.7" If employment appears to contribute to the
assault, the concurrence of the personal cause will not prevent
compensation. 71 In Carter, the court noted that Carter and
Crosby did not know each other, had no long-standing difficulty
and, but for the chance sighting, Carter might never have encoun-
tered Crosby again, let alone been harmed by him." This situa-
tion is contrasted drastically with one in which an employee is
stalked by a third person who ultimately commits an assault on
the premises of his victim's employer.7 3
Carter may be the initial step towards elimination of the
distinction between injuries "arising out of employment" and
69. 1 LARSON § 11.21.
70. In holding that Carter's injuries arose out of his employment, the court restated
its traditional and oft-used definition of the term:
It [the injury] arises 'out of' employment, when there is apparent to the
rational mind upon consideration of all of the circumstances, a causal connec-
tion between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed
and the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have
followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a
reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure
occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises 'out of' the employ-
ment. But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment
as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the
workman would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The
causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighbor-
hood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent
of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected,
but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with
the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.
200 S.E.2d at 65, quoting from Bridges v. Elite, Inc., 212 S.C. 514, 519, 48 S.E.2d 497,
499 (1948).
71. 1 LARSON § 7.40.
72. 200 S.E.2d at 66.
73. In 1 LARSON § 11.21, Professor Larson colorfully describes such a factual situa-
tion which was at issue in Bridges v. Elite, Inc., 212 S.C. 514, 48 S.E.2d 497 (1948):
[Tihe deceased employee was shot by her lover in a sort of Frankie-and-
Johnnie tragedy. The inevitability of the murder is shown by the assailant's
attempt earlier to find her at her boarding house, after having sent word by a
friend that he was going to "put five 38's in her," a promise which he carried
out with perfect accuracy as to both number and caliber of the shots.
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those "in the course of employment."" The court, after reviewing
several cases which were labeled "strongly persuasive" 5 con-
cluded that compensation awards are justified when an employee
is required to perform his duties under circumstances in which he
is endangered by a peril from a source outside of and unrelated
to his actual work when the peril is known to the employer who
afforded the employee no protection or relief." Consequently,
sending an employee into a "zone of danger" creates the causal
relationship necessary to establish an injury "arising out of" em-
ployment."
IV. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
Consistent with workmen's compensation's basic purpose of
protecting employees from the hazards of their employment,
South Carolina provides compensation benefits for occupational
diseases. Occupational diseases are treated as though they are
74. "In the course of employment" refers to the time, place, and circumstances
under which the accident occurred. For example, in Beam v. State Workmen's Compensa-
tion Fund, 200 S.E.2d 83 (S.C. 1973), the court held that where two teachers were killed
in an automobile accident while travelling from Gaffney to Columbia to attend a teachers'
meeting, death arose out of and in the course of employment. At the time the teachers
were hired, their superintendent had told them that attendance at such meetings, al-
though not compulsory, was definitely urged, or expected, rather than merely encouraged.
In Eagles v. Golden Cove, Inc., 260 S.C. 113, 194 S.E.2d 397 (1973), the court held
that circumstances may create a presumption, even without medical testimony to satisfy
the "most probable" rule, that death arose out of and in the course of employment. In
Eagles, the employee was pronounced dead on arrival at a hospital after being discovered
by his co-workers lying on his back, foaming at the mouth and unable to speak. Minutes
before his condition was discovered, the deceased had told one of his co-workers that he
had been stung by a bee and had requested his co-worker to get help. Medical testimony
of the attending physician was that Eagles was dead on arrival at the hospital and that it
was possible for a bee sting to be fatal. The physician did not say that the death was most
probably caused by the sting, nor did he give an opinion as to the cause of death. The
commission, circuit court, and supreme court all agreed that the circumstances alone
provided a causal connection between injury and death.
75. 200 S.E.2d at 66-67.
76. Id. at 67.
77. See Berresi v. Ryan, 242 App. Div. 279, 275 N.Y.S. 370 (1934). In Berresi, a
chauffeur had a personal enemy who was also a customer of his employer. The employer
had knowledge of the enmity; notwithstanding this knowledge, the employer sent the
chauffeur with a load of grain to the enemy's premises where the employee was shot to
death. Compensation was awarded because the employer had knowingly sent the em-
ployee into a situation of special hazard and danger.
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-251 (1962) provides:
The words "occupational disease" mean a disease arising out of and in the
course of employment which is due to hazards in excess of those ordinarily
incident to employment and is peculiar to the occupation in which the employee
15
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injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, 79 and in
view of the gradual development and progressive nature of most
occupational diseases, this classification may produce overly
harsh results.
In Gunnells v. Raybestos-Manhattan, inc.,8f the court re-
versed an award of death benefits to the widow of a deceased
workman who died from asbestosis. Gunnells contracted asbesto-
sis in the course of his employment. Raybestos afterwards trans-
ferred Gunnells to a watchman's job but on December 29, 1961,
Gunnells became totally disabled as a result of asbestosis and was
forced to quit. This disablement represents the "injury by acci-
dent" which the statutes require."1 At the time Gunnells became
totally disabled, Raybestos' insurance carrier advised him that he
had not incurred a compensable disability. Consequently, Gun-
nells failed to pursue a workmen's compensation claim and ac-
cepted pension benefits. On April 30, 1969, Gunnells died as a
result of asbestosis and his widow initiated a claim for death
benefits.
Gunnells died over seven years after becoming totally disa-
bled by an occupational disease. A widow's claim for benefits is,
however, limited to cases in which "death results proximately
from an accident and within two years thereafter or while total
disability still continues and within six years after the
accident .. ."82 Unlike a statute of limitations which may be
waived for a reasonable excuse, 3 this code provision is a statutory
mandate from which the court cannot deviate. Continuous, total
disability and death within six years after the accident are condi-
tions precedent to the accrual of any right in the widow for com-
pensation benefits. 4 Since Gunnells died after the six year period,
the court held that the widow's asserted right never vested.
is engaged. A disease shall be deemed an occupational disease only if caused by
a hazard recognized as peculiar to a particular trade, process, occupation or
employment as a direct result of continuous exposure to the normal working
conditions thereof ....
79. Id. § 72-253. Disablement or death from occupational disease, rather than con-
traction of the disease, constitutes the event which is considered as an "injury by acci-
dent" for the purposes of the Act. See Glenn v. Columbia Silica Sand Co., 236 S.C. 13,
112 S.E.2d 711 (1960).
80. 261 S.C. 106, 198 S.E.2d 535 (1973).
81. See note 79 supra.
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-180 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
83. See Drake v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 241 S.C. 116, 127 S.E.2d 288 (1962).
84. 261 S.C. at 110, 198 S.E.2d at 536.
1974]
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In most states, including South Carolina, benefits and condi-
tions controlling compensability for occupational diseases are re-
stricted by a substantial array of statutory provisions. One of the
most common types of restrictive provisions bars claims unless
death or disability occurs within a specified number of years. 5
These restrictive provisions were originally based upon the fear
that industries in which occupational diseases were common
could not bear the financial impact of full liability." For example,
when Wisconsin introduced full silicosis coverage, it discovered
that insurance premiums in some industries promptly soared
higher than the payroll itself.8 7 States recognized that full com-
pensation coverage might force some industries to cease operation
and deter other similar industries from locating in the state.
Consequently, state legislatures responded to industry's desires
by throwing up a variety of barriers to full coverage. Makeshift
provisions were contrived to help employers and their insurance
carriers over transitional difficulties. These provisions, however,
remained in compensation acts long after their justification had
disappeared. The excessive costs of full coverage envisioned by
industry can be viewed as merely a temporary problem because
industries of the thirties had little understanding of various occu-
pational diseases and practiced poor preventive techniques.8
Gunnells represents the harshness of outdated industrial
fears and legislative action may be necessary to liberalize South
Carolina's statutory provisions. There is, currently, a general
trend toward revising occupational disease provisions which re-
quire that death or disability occur within specified periods. The
most commonly accepted alternative is "to make the period run
only from knowledge, real or constructive, of the condition and
its relation to employment, at the same time often removing or
extending considerably the absolute outside time limits on
claims.""5
In the absence of legislative reform, the restrictive provision
of South Carolina's compensation act which bars a widow's claim
if made more than six years after her husband's disablement may
not be able to pass constitutional muster. To be constitutional,
provisions of compensation acts cannot be arbitrary, unreasona-
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ble, or fundamentally unjust or oppressive. 0 Under South Caro-
lina's statutory provision, compensation awards may differ
drastically between two women whose husbands became disabled
from an occupational disease on the same day but where one
husband dies a day prior to the other. Such results require a
rational reason to justify what appears to be an arbitrary classifi-
cation and unreasonable distinction. With advanced medical
knowledge, prevention and treatment of occupational diseases
may have made original fears about the financial costs of full
coverage unfounded, and the rationale behind such classifications
may no longer exist.
At least one jurisdiction has considered the constitutionality
of restrictive occupational disease provisions. In Gauthier v.
Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co.,9" the Supreme Court
of Michigan refused to consider differences in compensation rates
between victims of silicosis and victims of other injuries
unconstitutional as an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
In evaluating the rationale behind Michigan's rate compensation
scheme, the court noted:
Any argument that the scheme is now "obsolete" as to future
disabilities must wait consideration on a record which presents
some facts from which it might be deduced that the legislative
reasoning had lost all value with passage of time and change of
circumstances.1
2
Two years later, the court, in McDaniel v. Campbell, Wyant &
Cannon Foundry Co., 3 relied upon a 1958 cost study of silicosis
to uphold the constitutionality of Michigan's maximum limita-
tion on benefits to victims of silicosis. The study indicated that
silicosis was concentrated in relatively few industries and that
average compensation costs for silicosis victims run higher than
for other injuries. In view of these facts the court found a reasona-
ble basis in the possibility that insurance costs to employers
would skyrocket.
A cost study conducted over sixteen years ago cannot accur-
ately reflect current medical advancements in the treatment and
prevention of occupational diseases. Moreover, McDaniel is read-
90. Marshall v. Drew F. Mahoney Co., 56 F.2d 74, 78 (9th Cir. 1932).
91. 360 Mich. 510, 104 N.W.2d 182 (1960).
92. Id. at 523-24, 104 N.W.2d at 188-89. Claimant in Gauthier placed no facts in the
record to suggest that the classification complained of was obsolete.
93. 367 Mich. 356, 116 N.W.2d 835 (1962).
19741
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ily distinguishable from Gunnells in which death benefits were
denied absolutely rather than merely limited by a different stan-
dard. Time limitations which are conditions precedent to exten-
sion of coverage and which are not subject to alteration by miti-
gating circumstances or reasonable excuses may be constitution-
ally infirm.9
ROBERT E. SALANE
94. Contra, Emmons v. Keller, 21 Ohio St. 2d 48, 254 N.E.2d 687 (1970). The South
Carolina Legislature has recognized the inherent injustice of barring death benefits in
ionizing radiation injuries which are slowly progressive. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-285(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1973) provides:
The time for filing claims for benefits in the event of death shall not begin
to run until the person entitled to file such claims knows, or by the exercise of
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